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Introduction
The importance of financial reporting, as reflected in accounting standards, has been controversial among academicians. What role, if any, financial disclosure has in determining security prices is not clear? The strong form of the efficient market hypothesis implies that such information is totally redundant. Rational expectations theory predicts that investors always have unbiased forecasts of future values. Excluding the very special case of rational expectations bubbles, speculative bubbles, if they exist, clearly are incompatible with rational expectations. 1 The existence of speculative bubbles is also controversial. It is nevertheless plausible to suppose that more stringent reporting requirements more closely align market values with fundamentals.
Several studies have claimed that poor accounting and financial reporting practices are the causes of the collapse of the U.S. financial market in October 1929 and the Southeast Asian market in the late 1990s (Zeff (1972) and MacDonald (1998) ). Greenspan (1998) , Haley (2000) , and Vishwanath and Kaufmann (2001) further suggested that accounting practices that help promote transparency make financial crisis less likely. Rathman (1998) proposed the adoption of international accounting standards (IAS) as a means to improve disclosure quality among countries. Support for standardized accounting standards internationally has increased over time. One of the supposed benefits of standardizing accounting standards is that this will enhance market efficiency.
This paper examines if the presence of speculative bubbles is related to a countrys financial disclosure level. A countrys financial disclosure level refers to the quantity and intensity of information reported in meeting statutory requirements, exchange filing and listing requirements, and capital market expectations (Saudagaran and Biddle (1992) ). Country disclosure rankings used in this paper are due to Saudagaran and Biddlehenceforth, S&B (1992) .
The term speculative bubble is used in the general sense that high returns by themselves cause investors to bid prices higher, i.e., speculative bubbles are caused by past price performance rather than underlying fundamentals. Disappointments are inevitable. A speculative bubble, therefore, occurs when upswings are gradual and downswings are rapid; a return pattern that is asymmetric. The duration dependence test is associated with rational expectations bubbles. Duration dependence; however, will be observed whenever investors buy based solely on past price performance and drive prices above their fundamental values.
Research on speculative bubbles began with volatility tests. Shiller (1981) found that U.S. stock prices during the period of 1871-1979 fluctuate too much assuming perfect foresight and a constant discount rate. The excess volatility of stock prices is consistent with stock prices that are characterized by speculative bubbles or meanreverting fads (Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) ). The excess volatility results were controversial (see, for example, Flavin (1983) , Kleidon (1986) , and Marsh and Merton (1986) , and West (1987) ). Flavin (1983) and Kleidon (1986) claimed that the excess volatility results were due to small sample bias, while Marsh and Merton (1986) attributed them to dividend smoothing by managers. West (1987) Rational expectations bubbles have the characteristic that as the length of the bubble increases the probability of a crash decreases; otherwise the bubble cannot be sustained in a rational market. The duration dependence test allows the probability of the end of a run to differ depending on the run length and on the type of run (positive or negative). Rational expectations bubbles are very specific types of bubble requiring a specific relationship between a departure from fundamental values and the probability of a run ending. The presence of speculative bubbles, a far more general phenomenon, is consistent with duration dependence. Speculative bubbles are likely to exist if it is observed that there is a negative relationship between the probability of a run of positive returns ending and the length of the run. In other words, the presence of bubbles suggests positive duration dependence or a negative hazard rate. McQueen and Thorley (1994) found evidence of speculative bubbles in the monthly real returns for both equally-andvalue-weighted portfolios of all NYSE stocks during the period of 1927 to 1991.
In this paper, we examine if financial disclosure has any effect on the likelihood of speculative bubbles. That is, are stock markets in countries with less disclosure more prone to speculative bubbles? We focus on eight major international stock markets. The eight countries are ranked from the highest to the lowest in terms of disclosure. The countrys disclosure level rankings (DLR) are from a study done by Saudagaran and Biddle (1992) . According to S&B (1992) , the United States has the highest disclosure level, followed in order by Canada, United Kingdom, Netherlands, France, Japan, Germany, and Switzerland. 2 We employ the nonparametric duration dependence test developed by McQueen and Thorley (1994) to test for the presence of bubbles.
The disclosure of financial information, unfortunately, is only one of many factors that differ among the countries we examine. From this perspective our results cannot be viewed as conclusive. Institutional factors across these countries differ in so many aspects that it is difficult, if not impossible, to control for all of them. In addition, the duration dependence test, unlike regression tests, does not allow for multiple effects.
The empirical results we obtain show that Japan, a country with a relatively low level of disclosure shows evidence consistent with the presence of a bubble, while countries in the high disclosure group do not show any evidence of bubbles. However, the no-bubble hypothesis is not rejected for real returns of Germany and Switzerland.
Both of which have very low disclosure levels. The implications of our results are discussed in the concluding section.
The rest of the paper is organized as followed: Section II reviews the theory of capital market efficiency and bubbles. Section III presents the duration dependence test procedure. Section II and III follow McQueen and Thorley (1994) closely. Section IV describes the data used and presents the empirical results of the test. Section V presents the conclusions of the study.
II. Rational Bubble Model
If capital market is efficient the fundamental value of stock price equals the expected discounted present value of the future cash flows i.e. dividends.
However, according to Shiller (1978) , Blanchard and Watson (1982) , and West (1987) , equation (1) is not the only equilibrium solution. Stock prices can be expressed in the following form and still be the solution to the equilibrium condition.
(2) t t t B P P * , 3 Market efficiency implies that the expected rate of return on a stock is equal the required rate of return, E[R t+1 ] = r t+1 where E t denotes the mathematical expectation conditional on the information set at time t and r t is the required rate of return, . P t represents the stock price at time t and D t+1 represents the future value of dividend at time t+1. Assuming the r t+i =r i, current stock price equals the expected future price and dividends discounted at the investors required rate of return, . The fundamental value of the assets, is obtained by substituting P t+1 into current stock price equation and solving recursively.
where E t [B t+1 ] = (1+r t+1 )B t and r t+1 is assumed to be non-stochastic. Equation (2) indicates that stock prices, in equilibrium might not rationally reflect fundamental value. new test for rational speculative bubbles. Bubbles are characterized as a continuing increase in price or a long run of positive abnormal returns followed by a crash. One of the characteristics of bubbles is a nonlinear pattern in returns. If security prices contain a bubble, there will exist a run of positive abnormal returns that will exhibit duration dependence (a decreasing hazard rate). In other words, the probability of observing the end of a positive run decreases with the length of the run, otherwise a bubble will quickly burst.
Tests of duration dependence can be implemented by examining the hazard rate (h i ) for runs of positive and negative abnormal returns. McQueen and Thorley (1994) defined the hazard rate as the probability of an observed negative innovation given a sequence of i prior positive innovations, h i = Prob( t < 0 t-1 > 0, t-2 >0, t-i > 0, t-i-1 < 0) decreases with i. Specifically, if bubbles exist, the hazard rates for runs of positive excess return, h i+1 < h i for all i. 4 This condition, however, does not hold for runs of negative abnormal returns because rational expectations bubbles cannot be negative. 5 4 See original paper of McQueen and Thorley (1994) for full detail derivation of this equation. 5 In some certain situations, positive bubbles are also ruled out. For example, bubbles cannot exist if the market participants have infinite horizons (Tirole (1982) ) and if assets have terminal values (Brock (1982) ). Tirole (1985) also argued that bubbles cannot occur if the interest rate is greater than the growth rate of Therefore, duration dependence (a decreasing hazard rate) in a positive run, but not in negative runs, is consistent with the existence of rational bubbles. 6 Unlike the traditional bubble tests such as autocorrelation, skewness, and kurtosis, duration dependence test allows for a nonlinear pattern of returns.
Speculative bubbles are a far more general and a far more likely phenomenon than rational expectations bubbles. Speculative bubbles are characterized by what some have referred to as irrational exuberance (Shiller, 2000, p.3) . If a significant number of investors trade on noise, random positive innovations in price may be perceived as indicating even higher returns in the future. If price increases induce even greater price innovations, then herding behavior can lead to positive duration dependence.
The existence of speculative bubbles is, of course, controversial. Ultimately, it is an empirical issue. There is enough evidence to suggest that it is not unreasonable to consider whether or not the disclosure system affects the likelihood of bubbles emerging in a market.
III. Duration Dependence Test Procedure
In this paper, the duration dependence test is performed on the transformed real returns in both dollar-denominated and local currencies. The major reason for using dollar-denominated currency is the growing interest in the international equity markets.
Investors possibly view stocks in an international framework and the dollar is the international currency.
economy. Assets that are subject to price bubbles must have a resale value, and a fixed supply (Merton (1987) ). 6 McQueen and Thorley (1994) show that inequality condition h i+1 < h i also holds even when fundamental innovations are not symmetrically distributed.
We first transform the monthly real returns series of each country into run lengths of positive and negative returns. A run is a sequence of returns that has the same sign.
For example, for a data set that consists of ten observations, the maximum numbers of runs can be ten, while the minimum numbers of runs can be one. Hence, the data series consist of a set, S T where T is the number of observations on the random run length, i.
For each country, the return series being tested are two groups of T observations of positive and negative runs where the number of observations in each group does not necessary have to be equal. The hazard function (h i ) , is defined as h i Prob(I=i I i) 7
represents the probability that a specific run ends at length i, provided that it lasts until length i. McQueen and Thorley (1994) defined the log likelihood function of hazard function as follows:
The functional form for the hazard function is based on the logistic transformation of the log of i.
where N i is the number of completed runs of length i in the sample. M i and Q i are the numbers of completed and partial runs with length greater than i. 8 Partial runs are the runs that occur at the beginning or at the end of the period investigated. For illustrative purposes, the number of runs of each length for a return series that starts with three 7 The hazard function, rather than density function is used because the former describes the data in terms of conditional probabilities while the latter emphasizes on unconditional probabilities. The hazard function is more relevant to this research because we examine the probability of a run continues conditioned on the length of the run. However, the hazard function is also related to the density function. Hazard rate can be defined as h i = f i /(1-F i ) where f i is the discrete density function and F i is the cumulative density function for i. 8 According to McQueen and Thorley (1994) , Q i can be ignored when the sample size is large. positive returns followed by two negative returns, three positive, and one negative will be 1 negative run of length two and 1 positive run of length three. The sample estimated hazard rate for length i is defined as follows:
The null hypothesis of no bubble implies that the probability of a run ending is unrelated to the prior returns, or the probability of obtaining positive and negative abnormal returns is random regardless of the prior sequence. In other words, the null hypothesis of no duration dependence is that = 0 or a constant hazard rate. The alternative hypothesis of a bubble being present suggests that the probability of a positive run ending should decrease with the length of the run or, specifically, the value of parameter , should be negative (decreasing hazard rate).
Duration dependence tests are performed by substituting equation (7) into (6) is asymptotically distributed 2 with one degree of freedom.
(9) LRT = 2[Log Unrestricted -Log Restricted] . 2 1 IV.
Empirical Results

Data
The data used in this study consist of two parts. The first part is the ranking of countrys disclosure levels based on the study done by Saudagaran and Biddle (1992) .
The 
Countrys Disclosure Ranking
A ranking of disclosure levels is assigned to the eight countries by using the financial disclosure index created by Saudagaran and Biddle (1992) . Table 1 shows the results of countrys disclosure level rankings (DLR) based on studies done by S&B in 1992. 9 In 1992, S&B created a new country disclosure index from a survey result of 142 experts who engaged in the process of listing securities in the foreign stock exchanges.
The participants (63 U.S. and 79 non-U.S.) were people from different fields of business such as corporate managers, investment bankers, public accountants, stock exchange officers, academics, and so on. The financial disclosure level is designed to include both voluntary and mandatory disclosures. The participants ranked the countries in three areas: statutory reporting requirements, exchange reporting requirements, and capital 9 In 1989, S&B constructed country disclosure indices by taking the average of the ranking obtained from three previous studies done by Lafferty & Cairns (1980) , Choi & Bavishi (1982) , and Cairns et al (1984) .
The results suggest that firms in the United States (a disclosure rank of 8) had the highest levels of disclosure, followed in order by the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Canada, France, Japan, Germany, and Switzerland. market expectations. S&B (1992) rankings also provide overall disclosure level scores.
The United States is the country that has the most comprehensive disclosure level, followed in order by Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, Japan, Germany, and Switzerland. 10 Saudagaran and Biddleshenceforth S&B (1992) country disclosure ranking is used in this study for several reasons: First, it is the most comprehensive and widely used country disclosure index (see, for example, Alford, Jones, Leftwich and Zmijewski (1993), Saudagaran and Biddle (1995) , and Higgins (1998)). Second, S&Bs (1992) rankings include both voluntary and mandatory disclosures while other disclosure studies rankings are based solely on mandatory disclosure. Third, the S&B index is the most recent ranking and is consistent with previous studies (see, for example, Lafferty and Carins (1980) , Choi and Bavishi (1982) , and Cairns, Lafferty and Mantle (1984)). Table 2 shows the summary of financial reporting requirements of eight countries prepared by Alford et al. (1993) . This summary shows the areas of diversity in accounting standards across countries. The sources of GAAP for all countries except the United States and Canada are derived from government sources only. U.S. GAAP is derived from both public (SEC) and private (FASB) sources, while Canadian GAAP is derived from a private source. According to Ali and Hwang (2000) , countries where the private sectors do not get involved in setting accounting standards are associated with less value relevant financial reports. The U.S. disclosure requirements are the most comprehensive in terms of meeting both statutory and investors demands. There is a relation among the sources of GAAP, level of alignment between financial and tax 10 The results are consistent with the previous studies conducted in 1989 except that the order of countries in the high disclosure group is changed. accounting, and a countrys disclosure level. Countries with low levels of disclosure are associated with a high level of alignment between financial and tax reporting requirements. High conformity between tax and financial reports encourages firms to reduce taxes by reporting lower profits; hence the published financial reports are less valuable for financial analysis (Ali and Hwang (2000)). The accounting standard in Japan is dual in the sense that the extent of disclosure in annual reports is prescribed by both the Commercial Code (CC) and the Securities and Exchange Law (SEL). The financial reports prepared under the CC, which are distributed to the shareholders, contain less information than those prepared under the SEL, which are reported to the Stock Exchange, but not sent to the shareholders (Cooke (1993) ).
Duration dependence tests are implemented on continuously compounded monthly real returns of eight countries for both dollar-denominated and local currencies.
To compute the continuously compounded nominal returns, R t , we use the following formula:
(10) R t = ln P t ln P t-1 ,
where P t represents the price index at the end of the month for period t. portmanteau test statistics with twelve lags rejects the null hypothesis of no serial autocorrelation for returns in the Netherlands and Switzerland at a less than five percent level of significance.
Conventional methods such as tests of skewness, excess kurtosis, and autocorrelation for detecting the serial dependence of the returns assume the stationarity and linearity of returns. The degree of serial dependence among successive price changes could be highly nonstationary during a period characterized by bubbles. Hence, an autocorrelation test that assumes stationarity of returns may have low statistical power in detecting the presence of bubbles. The next section provides the empirical results based on the duration dependence test.
Empirical Results
Tables 5 and 6 report the positive and negative run frequency, sample hazard rate for each run length, Log-Logistic test, and Log Likelihood ratio test for dollardenominated real returns of countries under investigation. Japan (a disclosure rank of 3)
shows the longest positive run of 16 months, followed by Germany (a disclosure rank of 2) with a positive run of 14 months. The U.S., France, and Switzerland show the shortest positive run of 9 months.
For real returns in local currencies, Japan also shows the longest positive run of 15 months. This is followed by Canada, the Netherlands, and Germany with a positive run that lasts for 12 months (Table 7) . Among the eight countries, France reports the shortest positive run lengths lasting only 8 months.
The negative runs were typically shorter in length, the longest negative run lasts only for 10 and 9 months in both dollar-denominated and local currencies, respectively.
In terms of dollar-denominated currency, the Netherlands reported the longest negative run, while U.S., U.K., France, and Germany have the longest negative run in the local currency. Japan reports the shortest negative runs length of 6 months is dollardenominated currency; while Switzerland reported the shortest negative run lengths of 6 months in its own currency. It is interesting to note that Japan, a country with a relatively low disclosure level, has the longest positive and the shortest negative runs. This pattern suggests nonrandom behavior of returns that is consistent with the presence of bubbles.
The sample hazard rates as shown in equation (8), are also reported in Tables 5   through 8 . The sample hazard rate determines the probability that a run ends at particular length i (bubble bursts) given that a particular return of the same sign observed in a row that lasts until i (bubble grows). 15 As shown in Tables 5 and 6 , for Japan, there are 93 positive runs and 93 negative runs for a total of 186 runs of real returns (dollardenominated currency). There are 46 runs of positive returns that last at least for one month. 19 out of 46 runs end in the second month. In other words, there is 41.30 percent probability that runs will end in the second month. Out of the remaining 27 runs, 14 runs last for two months, that is, 51.85 percent will end in the third month. Out of the remaining 13 runs, 7 runs last at least three months, 53.85 percent end in the fourth month and of the remaining 6 runs that last at least four months, only 2 or 33.33 percent end in the fifth month and so on. In other words, given a positive run that lasts for three consecutive months, there is a 53.85 percent probability that the return in the next period will be negative, or bubble bursts. The hazard rate of other countries can be interpreted in the same way.
In the absence of a speculative bubble, the hazard rate should be constant. The positive duration dependence finding for Japan is consistent with the presence of a bubble. Duration dependence of dollar denominated returns for Japan is not due to the exchange rate. Positive duration dependence was not found in the exchange rate series. Whether or not these findings lend support to the null hypothesis that speculative bubbles are more likely to be present in a country with a low level of disclosure is discussed in the next section.
V. Conclusions
This paper used the duration dependence test to examine the hypothesis that a lack of disclosure makes speculative bubbles more likely. This approach is based on the plausible hypothesis that the better informed that investors are, the less likely it is that prices will deviate from fundamental values.
Japan, a country with a low level of disclosure, shows evidence consistent with the existence of a bubble. This, however, is not conclusive evidence in favor of the hypothesis. Switzerland has the lowest level of disclosure but the no-bubble hypothesis is not rejected in that case. For several reasons, Switzerland, however, may not be representative. The Swiss traditionally have a high stake in maintaining both secrecy and conservative business practices. This may make the Swiss unrepresentative. There is, however, no clear pattern for the remaining countries. It is also important to note that the duration dependence test is unlikely to find a bubble unless there is strong evidence to suggest that the no-bubble hypothesis should be rejected.
We would not expect that a low level of disclosure will always produce a bubble.
Speculative bubbles are episodic events. We conjecture that the proponents of a relationship between bubbles and disclosure, would at most argue that low disclosure makes bubbles more likely. This research seems to suggest that speculative bubbles and disclosure, particularly in the international context is warranted. 
